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ABSTRACT 
ouot. EY KNOx U8RARY 
f1AVA( >"O>TGRADUATE eCHOOl 
MOt,It.tH:.Y CA ~101 
Lemmings are autonomous tracked underwater vehicles which uti lize a swanning 
approal:h to mine detection and neutralization in thc vel)' shallow water, surf, and beach 
zones (VSW/SZIBZ) The Navy and the Marine Corps are in great need of developing an 
dfective "in stridc" clearanccibreaching method to further enhance the effectiveness and 
viabi~ty of their littoral warfare skil!s The Lemmings system has the potential to fulfill this 
critical need in a cost effective, reliable manner 
Utilizing the Janus interactive wargaming simulation, an amphibious operation was 
modeled, with the amphibious landing taking place through a minefield in the littoral zones 
Three scenarios of this model were developed an amphibious landing through a minefield 
utilizing no clearLngibreachmg assets; an amphibious landing through a minefield utilizing 
curren! c1earinglbJ eaching asse:s; and an amphibious landing through a minefield utilizing 
Lemming swarms as the clearinglbreaching assets 
A comparative analysis of these three scenarios will be perfonned, examining Ihe 
measures of effectiveness of landing vehicles killed/damaged, combat power ashore at a given 
time, MCM a%ets killed, and percentage or mines neutrali7ed 
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A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the tactical effectiveness of the Lemming 
swarmiug approach as a mine countermeasure in the very shallow water, surf zone, and 
beach zone (VS\V/SZIBZ) and compare this new technology with current naval mine 




Mine warfare is by definition the strategic and tactical use of sea mines and their 
countermeasun:s, including all offensive and defensive mining and protection against 
mines. However, mining and ]nine countermeasures (MCM) are two distinctly different 
operations, both of which have significant places in the histOlY of naval warfare 
The history ofTnine warfare in the United States dates back to the American 
Revolution and Uavid Bushnell's lamed experiments with underwater explosives and 
submers~btes . In the summer of 1777. Bushnell cabled toget her a double line of contact 
mines (contact-primed powder kegs) to attack the British frigate Cerverus off the coast of 
Connecticut The Cerverus survived, hut only after a schooner was destroyed along with 
its crew while attempting to haul in the mines Bushnell's early attempts at mining met 
with litt le success, though the attempt in this case tllmed out to be what was significant, 
not the failure of the mines to inflict relevant damage. [Ref 1J 
Bushnell's mine warfare efforts were in the mining arena, not mine 
countermeasures. Though mining plays a significant role in the history of mine warfare in 
the United States, so too do mine countermeasures Mine warfare history is filled with 
accounts of naval efforts to counter enemy mines at sea The first mine countermeasure 
device, a raft with grappling hooks, was used during the American Civil War by Union 
forces in 1862. [Ref 2] The advl:nt and use of such MCM contributed directly to the 
success of America's most famous MCM operation, Rear Admiral David Glasgow 
Farragut 's dramatic I:ntrance through the mine line into Mobile Bay in 1864_ The legend 
of farragut's "damn thl;! torpedoes" episode draws a picture ofa daring man who risked 
an unknown mine threat to defeat thl;! enemy_ The reality is that FarragUl was a daring 
man, but one who utilized every conceivable intel ligence gathering capability available at 
the time to form an educated assessment of the mine threat before going "full speed 
ahead" As Tamara Moser Melia asserts in her book, Damn the Torped~~QI1 
H~ of U S Naval Mine Coill!.tt!Jn~, l.lZH22l, the lesson we should haw 
learned from Admiral Farragut's daring is not that you should boldly and blindly go 
forward into an unknown threat, but rather should meticulously examine, evaluate, and 
attempt to neutralize the threat prior to putting people and forces at risk. Admiral 
Farragut did not, as many assert, merely "damn" the mines at Mobile Bay but, rather, 
assiduously hunted, examined, and disabled them before steaming into the bay. [Ref 1) 
WWI was the tirst major war where the effects of mining had tremendous 
consl:quences on naval forces The British were very successful in mining a significant 
portion of the North Sea in their efforts to keep the Gennan fleet isolated_ One ofthe 
most telling mining operations during \II/WI was conducted by the Turks in their efforts to 
defend the Dardanelles and Constantinople from A!\ied attack_ In },,{arch of 191 5, a force 
of some eighteen French and British battleships entered the Dardanelles in an effort to 
knock out Turkish batteries along the coast, breach known minefields, conduct naval 
bombardment of Constantinople, and hence split the Ottoman Empire. However, the 
operation did not go as planned_ The Allies' inability to clear mines while faced with a 
battery of Turkish guns and the Turkish ability to lay mines relatively undetected during 
such an operation resulted in the sinking of three Allied battleships and severe damage to 
three others_ In less than six hours, one-third of the Allied forces in the operation had 
been either damaged or destroyed Not onJy did minl;!S stop the Allied attack, but it also 
forced the Allies in to an amphibious raid ofGallipoli a month later. The amphibious 
operation resulted in 50,000 AJlied battle deaths. Mining during \VWI was so successful, 
m pall, because this was the first major war where mining was used extensively and the 
shock value thus was great, and because mining tedUlology was far ahead of mine 
countermeasure technology_ WWI proved that mining was here to stay 
Of course, there are many other famous accounts of mining and MC\-! in the 
history of warfare The aerial mining of Haiphong Harbor in 1972 stopped all ship 
movement and the U S had to conduct sweeping effons as a condition of peace. In 1982, 
Argentina used obsolete WWI-era mines to block access to Port Stanley during the 
Falklands War. In 1984, Libya planted Soviet "export" mines in the Gulf of Suez and the 
Red Sea. Again, the US was called upon to dean up the mines We must not forget the 
Persian Gulf threat, where the USS Samuel B Robert~ struck a mine in 1988 and then 
during Desert Storm the Tripoli (LPH-IO), the flagship of allied MCM operations, and 
the guided-mis~ile cruiser Princeton (CG-59), each struck mines within hours of each 
other Additionally, during Desert Storm, the US. would have had to face a very real 
mine threat had an amphibious landing eventually been ordered. In fact, the US had been 
conducting extensive minesweeping operations in preparation for such an assault 
Fortunately an amphibious assault was not necessary. lRef. : J 
2. Amphibious Operations 
a, Composition and Objecth-e 
An amphibious operation will be defined as an operat ion launched from the 
sea hy naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hosti le shore There are 
four types of amphibious operations: amphibious assault, hostile or potent ially hostile 
shore, amphibious ra id; amphibious demonstration; and amphibious withdrawaL Each 
type of operation is designed to achieve specific and different resul ts. This thesis will 
focus on the amphibious assault The amphihious assault differs from the other operations 
in that it involves establi shing a force on a hostile shore Once ashore, the goal of such a 
force is generally to prosecute further combat operations; obtain a site for an advanced 
naval or air base; or deny the use of an alea or facilities to the enemy Given such critical 
goals, the amphibious operation is a complete operation within itself It includes planning, 
embarkation ofuoops and equipment, rehearsals, movement to the objective area, final 
preparation of the objective, assault landing of troops and accompanying supplies and 
equipmem, and continued support of the landing force (LF) until tennination ofthe 
operation Clearly, the success ofs\lch a complex operation requires intense coordination, 
ciear communications, and thorough preparation and intelligence, among other things 
Essential factors in the conduct of such an assault are flexibility of plans and speed in their 
execution [Ref 151 This thesis will analyze a potential asset in the form of the Lenuning 
system for helping to ensure speed of execution in an amphibious landing 
The organization responsible for the amphibious assault is the amphibious 
task force (ATF). The assault phase of an amphibious operation begins when the assault 
elements of the AIF arrive in assigned positions in the objective area and tenninates with 
the accomplishment of the AIF mission. The ATF always includes Navy forces and a LF, 
with aviation assets as required . The assault phase encompasses preparation by air strikes 
and naval gunfire, ship-to-shore movement of the LF; landings in landing and drop zones 
and on beaches by the assault clements of the LF; operations inland to assist in seizing the 
beachhead; provision of logistic, air, and naval gunfire support of the attack throughout 
the assault, and finally the landing of remaining force elements required to complete the 
ATF mission [Ref 151 
The Navy forces ofthe AIF are composed ofvar1oUS task groups as 
required by the objectivc. Examples of such task groups are: Transportation Groups, 
which include all shipping in which the LF is embarked; Control Group, designed to 
control ship-to-shore movement; and the Mine Warfare (M\\'1 Group, which is comprised 
of MCM and/or minelaying assets. There are other groups, such as Tactical Air Control 
Groups, Fire Support Groups, Screening Group, and ~everal more, bUI they are nOI 
rdevant to the simulations created for this thesis. [Ref 15] 
The LF is comprised of command l)l;::adquaners and the comuat, combat 
support, and combat service support unit~, aviation and ground, assigned thereto to 
conduct the amphibious assault. The amphibious assault takes place within the assault 
area , which inchlde, the beach area, the boat lanes, the lines of departure, the landing ship 
areas, the transport areas, and the fire support areas in the immediate vieiruty orthe uoat 
lanes. The battalion landing team (EL T) is the uasic task organization ofthc Lf for the 
movement from ship to shore. The assault is initiated by the Assault E(;hclon (AE), 
composed of assault troops, landing craft, amphibious vehicles, helicopters, equipment, 
and supplies. The AE is launched from the line of departure, a designated line off-shore, 
approximately parallel to the landing beach. The AEs transit to the heach is conducted 
through boat lanes extending seaward from the landing beach to the line of departure 
Each wave of the BL T, the first of whi(;h is in the AE, proceeds to designated landing 
zones as part of the total assault force effort at rapidly establishing a beachhead, a 
necessal)' requirement to expedite the landing of remaining troops and equipment 
Establishment of the beachhead is the first major accomplishment toward meeting the ATF 
mission and completing the a~sault. [Ref 15J 
b. Operational ,'\,faneuverfrom the Sea 
The objective of maneuver warfare is to collapse the enemy's will to fight 
It seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected 
actions, creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy 
cap-not cope This is accomplished by using tempo, speed, and surprise to apply strength 
against selected critical vulnerabilities orthc enemy [Ref 3] Operational maneuver from 
the sea (OMFTS) is a blending of maneuver warfare with amphibious operations Using 
the sea, air, and land as one maneuver space, the aim ofOMFTS is to project the Marine 
air-ground task force ashore seamlessly, striking decisively at the heart of the enemy's will 
to resist [Ref 3J Ot-.-1FTS makes the presumption that ships at sea and Marines on land 
form a single, cohesive force, with no dividing line, either in time, space, or operational 
concept. As such, OrvfFTS can take filll advantage of the extraordinary mohility offered 
by naval forces withowloss of momentum during the ship-to-shore transition, {deally, 
OWTS offers an incredible opportunity to exploit our forces to their fullest extent while 
inflicting maximum damage on an enemy in a very short time However, in practice, an 
O}.fFTS i~ full of many variahles, some of which are potential show stoppers if 
unidentified andlor not appropriately dealt with in a timely manner. One such variable is 
mine warfare and the ever present threat of enemy mines 
3. !\'linc.~, Minefields, and the Enemy Threat 
Many different mine capabilities are necessary to he able to conduct effective mine 
warfare in various situations Consequently, there are many mine types and classifications, 
each designed to meet certain nunc warfare requirements. Mines may be classified in 
several ways, for example as offensive or defensive, hottom or moored, contact or 
influence, as well as by size, type ofinf1uence, intended target, and method of delivery 
Aciditionally, mines can he deployed in a wide range of depths, henceforth defined as 
follows 
* Deep water : greater than 200 feet 
* Shallow water (SW) from 200 to 40 feet 
- Very shallow water (VSW): from 40 to 10 feet 
Surf zone (S2). from 10 fect to the high water mark (HWM) 
• Beach wne (Bl): from the HWM inland 
The Bl is sometimes referred to as the craft landing zone (CLl) 
A minefield (MF) is any collection of mines intentionally laid in some designated 
pattern or grouping intended to thwart the forward progress of an adversary. Mincfields, 
like mines, may be classified as offensive or defensive. An offensive MF might be laid 
covertly in a foreign harbor or shipping channel, while a defensive MF might be laid along 
a coast line in order to prevent an attacking force from launching all amphibious landing 
rhe composition ofa r..1F might include one type of mine or a combination of several 
types, all designed to affect spccific enemy forces in a particular rnarnler 
C. 1\1JNE COUNT£Rl\1EASIJRES 
I. Background 
In the words of Admiral Frank B. Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), 
October 1991 
I believe there are some fundamenta ls about mine warfare that we 
should not forget Once mines arc laid, they are quite difficult to get 
rid of That is not likely to change 1t is probably going to get worse, 
bl:cause mines are going to become more sophisticated. [Ref 4] 
With the brief history of mine warfare presented, the impact of mining and MCM is 
clear The threat is real and the potential blow of mining great The U. S. has been 
battling mines ~ince the Civil War and the affects of mining on naval operations has 
changed litt le since Mines in the Persian Gulf during Desert Storm served as yet another 
reminder ofthe importance ofMCM and continued research and development efforts in 
lhl: MCM warfare area The CNO heeded the lessons and recogniz.ed the successes of 
mining and MCi"v1 during Desert Shield/Desert Stonn and, as such, directed a new m.ine 
warfare plan to be developed and acted upon. On January 29, 1992, the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, Department ofthc Navy, published the Mine Warfare Plan 
Meelin>! the ChaHen<res ofan llncenain World . [Ref. 41 
rhe Mine Warfare Plan (MWP) provides the framework for serious discussion of 
the requirements for an effective mine warfure force Included is an assessment of the 
Navy's mine and MCr.·I forces and capabilities in early 1992 and an outline of the strengths 
a;"ld weaknesses of those forces . Most importantly, the i\-lWP discusses the Navy's mine 
warfare pian and stra:egy for dealing with future threats and calls for a greater 
COITumtment to effective utilization of current mine warfare assets and emphasizes the 
need to identify and develop new mine warfare technologies to meet anticipated future 
threats [Ref. 4J 
The M\\lP lists priority issues to be dealt with, one of which is an acknowledgment 
of the problems in conducting efficient, effective and speedy 
(":11 stride") MCM operations in the VSW/szrsz environments Coupled with these 
priority issues are certain "critical initiatives and programs that we seek to emphasize in 
the coming yeals," one of which is the need to address the V$\V/SZtBZ mine/obstacle 
countermeasures problems. The ~"'1:\VP takes into account the need to 
enhunce our ,\1CV capabililies for regional contingencies and 
independent operations, providing the people, training, systems, and 
forces upon which we will rely in the future_ Most fundamentally, the 
MWP reflects the enabling role mine warfare plays in our ahility to 
control the seas and project military power into distant Ihealers, 
during peacetime and war. [Ref 4] 
Following the spirit of the MVIP, this thesis serves to enhance our MCM 
capabilities for dealing with the problems posed by mines in the VSW/SZfBZ regions by 
investigating a new system, a new MCM technology, which may prove effective and 
lifesaving in dealing with such a threat, thus contributing to our ability to effectively 
project military powel into distant theaters 
2, Role in Amphibious Operations 
a, Current MCM Capabilities in the VSW!SZIBZ 
Though there are numerous MCM technologies being developed to combat 
mines in the littorals, the Navy must utilize today's technologies for any amphibious 
operations being planned or conducted in the near future_ Unfortunately, there are few 
MCM capabilities designed specifically for certain littorals, and this is especially true if "in 
stride" operations are required_ The concept of "in stride" will be discussed and defined in 
the foil owing section_ The Navy and Marine Corps must utilize existing technologies to 
combat mines in these regions This calls fo r some innovative ways to employ current 
MCM forces, often resulting in the llt.'cd to use a certain MCM technology in ways that it 
was no: originally designed to be used 
b. III Stride MCM Capabilities 
A senior official attending a mine countermeasures meeting in the fall of 
1992 expressed the opinion that, "the Navy cannot sweep in stride, so the Marines v,ill 
have to :hink up some other way of getting ashore." [Ref 5] Progress has been made 
since 1992, but nevenhclcss, this is a damning quote which deserves further explanation 
What is meant by sweeping "in stride" and what are Ihe implications of such a statement? 
for this thesis, "in stride" sweeping will he defmed to be the ability to breach a lane(s) 
through a minefield in the VSWiS7.fBZiust ahead of the LF, without impeding the 
scheoule of the amphihious assault and without slowing the speed of advance of the LF 
dueto a mine threat 
"In stride" sweeping is a formidahle task How close is the Navy to 
achieving such a capability? It is estimated that today's MCM assets can clear mines in 
water depths as shallow as 10 to 15 feet For shallower depths, however, there is 
currently no acceptably reliab le procedure for breaching mines in the SZlBZ_ This means 
that during the critical phase of an amphibious landing. the transition from sea to land, 
there is no sure way to comhat the mine threat for these ZOlles utilizing in stride breaching, 
arid thus preserve the advantages of speed and surprise This poses a great threat to the 
Marines and Lf !Ref 6J 
Of to day's MCM forces, the assets which come closest to being able to 
provide "in stride" breaching are the fl-ffi-53E Sea Dragon helicopter towing the Mk lOS 
Mk 106 Airborne Minesweeping System, the SPU-1W Magnetic Orange Pipe 
(MOP), and the Marine Corps' Amphibious Assault Vehicle 7Al (AAV) series outfitted 
with MCM equipment. The 1'lk 105 simulates the magnetic signatures ofvariou~ ships 
and the Mk 106 simulates both magnetic and aC{)ustie signatures, sweeping for magnetic 
and acoustic influence mines, and can be towed up to speeds of25 knots with a magnetic 
sweep width of some 600 feet_ The Mk 105 is rated to a minimum depth of 15 feet, 
however. when dealing \'{ith a real-world threat, the Mk 105 could be towed up to three 
feet of water The Mk 105/106 hydrofoil sled has significant "combat" experience and has 
proven to be a highly effective MCM asset, having been used during Operation End 
Sweep in 1973 to sweep Haiphong's main shipping channel, to sweep the Suez Canal a 
year later, and most recently used in the Persian Gulf during Desert Shield/Storm. [Ref 7] 
The MOP is a magnetized pipe 10 feet long filled with styrofoam for 
buoyancy that can be towed up to 15 knots three in tandem, thus olTering a magnetic 
sweep width of some 90 feet. The MOP can be towed to much shallower depths than the 
\1k 105/106, but has a tendency to lose its magnetic charge and 11I:ncc is not as reliable a 
breaching/clearing method. [Ref 2] 
The Mk 105/106 and the MOP only counter the magnetic Of acoustic mine 
threat and rely on helicopters, which are considered to be highly vulnerable in the flight 
envelope over the VSW/SZ/EZ regions For this reason, it becomes necessary to equip 
AAVs or other capable landing craft with MCM to address the non-magneticlnon-acoustic 
mine threats in the SZ/EZ regions. The AA V can be equipped with the Mine Clearance 
System Kit, a modular line charge system which can be bolted into the cargo 
compartment. This is a modified MI25 mine clearance system which uses a"Mk22 rocket 
motor fired from an elevated launcher raiL The line charge has a 550 meter range, can 
clear' 7m to either side of the line, and has an RO% clearance probability. [Ref. 121 
These MCM assets come close 10 meeting the "in stride" requirement, but 
none were designed for such a mission and are not reliable in the SUBZ environments Of 
particular concern is the vulnerability oftoday's landing forces in the SZ rcgion. Of all the 
current "in stride" MCM assets, none can effectively deal with mines in the SZ from about 
the 10 foot to 5 foot depth curve This critical area will be referred to as the "gap, and 
presently there are no MCM assets capable of dealing with it in a reliable manner 
The Navy is pu.rsuing a number ofSZ/EZ specific research and 
development (R&D) efforts to meet the "in stride" criteria and fill the "gap". One 
program, the precision emplacement of large cxplosive charges (PELEC), calls for the 
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delivery by B-52 of 1O,000-pound precision-guided bombs designed to penetrate to a 
depth of2! feet into the bottom sediment and detonate within O.Ol seconds of each other 
to create a line-charge analog. Several version~ of the PEtIT are being researched. [Ref 
5J Mother R&D effor1 involves outfitting the LCAC with mine-breaching equipment 
The so-called "MCAC" wi!! fire M':i8 line charges or similar explosive systems into the 
szmz during breaching operations. rRee 61 Several other R&D effons are underway, 
all designed to counter the SZlBZ mine threats. Unfor1unal.ely, none of these assets arc 
fleet ready and certainly none have been tested with real-world threats. "The mine 
problem in the VSW!SZlBZ is a special problem, and it requires nothing less than a special 
countermeasure" [Ree 51 
c. A1CAl Problem Areas 
The MCM problems associated with the vSW!SZmZ must be considered 
as major problems for the Navy, not just the MW community. In today's world, ou r forces 
will be and are calJed upon to deal with various regional threats, each with unique 
obstacles to overcome Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, U S. forces have been 
dil ectly involved in at least five signiiicant Lesser Regional Contingencies (LRC) or 
situations (persian Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and now lhe Balkan crisis). Each 
of these LRCs either did involve or could have involved a naval mine threat, Rwanda 
excluded. Access to mines by Third World states is increasingly less difIicult due to the 
huge inventory of Soviet mines in the newly independent former Soviet Republics and 
Russia These states are in great need of cash and are quite willing to sell off their 
inventory of mines and other conventional weapons in order to generate such currency 
l\'line warfare by its very nature is a significant threaL This threat is funher 
complicated in the VSW/Slffi2 The waves, the general envirollJUent, and the density of 
mines in these zones make MCM that much harder Add to this the requirement of "in 
stride" breaching and the ditliculties ofMW facing the Na\y become clear. The S2 
extends up to 350 yards from the beach along 75 percent of the world's coast line~ This 
\1 
dynamic littoral zone, complicated by varying bottom types and tidal patterns, can be 
u\llizcd by the enemy to create an extremely hostile barrier to a LF l\.1any different nune 
lypes, s:.lch as bottom contact, influence, moored, and anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, 
are available to potential enemies and are easily laid by a variety of means. '\,lost mines 
can even be laid by hand in the S2 at low tide, thus accounting for the great mine densities 
in these zones AJso, the ease of covert mining has changed little since the Turks laid 
mines right under the noses of the British during the Dardanelle campaign in WWl The 
"foam zone", the name given to the surfz.one by Marine combat engineers, will continue 
to pose serious problems to MCM efforts and future amphibious operations unti l more 
reliable solutions are adopted or developed by the Na.y [Ref 5] 
3. Solutions to MCM Problem Areas 
AJI of the R&D effons toward MCM in the VSW/SZlBZ offer a potential 
breakthro:.lgh in "in stride" capabilities, but are they cost effective and the best we can do? 
Only contin:.led testing and development will answer such a question. But, there are 
alternative solutions being developed which might more effectively and economically solve 
our MCM problems. One proposed solution is the Lenuning swanuing vehicle 
a. Lemmings 
Lemmings, developed by Foster-Miller, Inc. and currently undergoing field 
testing and analysis, were designed specifically to counter mines in the VSW/SZIBZ 
utilizing a swarming approach to nune collntermeasures. This thesis defines a swarm to be 
a large group of Lemmings employed together to sweep for and neutralize mines 
Lemmings are small (about 0_8 cufft per vehicle), tracked, oottom crawling, expendable 
mine hunter-killers which counter mines in the VSW/SZIBZ by employing a 
quasi-random search pattern which provides a high probability of successful neutralization 
ofmine~ in specified landing wnes. They are adaptable to various delivery means (air, 
surface, subsurface) and carry a wide variety of payloads, ranging from ordnance to 
surveillance The cost per unit is very low and their advantages over traditional 
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clearance/breaching mcthods are numerous, including covertness, limited risk to 
personnci, reliability, robustness, and "in smde" breaching capability both in the water and 
on tile beach A Lemming vehick is pictured in Figure 1. Deta ils of Lemming 
specifications, operating parameters, and swarm characteristics are contained in 
Fig ure 1. A Lemming Vehiclc Detecting a Tilt-Rod Mine 
Phote courtesy of Foster-Miller, Inc 
D. JANUS INTERACTIVE WARGAMING SIMULATION 
I. Simulation Modeling 
Computer simul ation is a technique for using computers to imitate the operations 
of various kinds of real-world facilities or processes, called systems. An example of a 
real-world process (system) that i~ amenable to simulation is the effects of va rio liS traffic 
light ti ming schemes on rush hour traffic. In order to study such systems scientifically, a 
set of assumptions about how it works must be made. These assumptions, ",hich usually 
take the form of mathematical or logical relationships, constitute a model that is used to 
try to gain some understanding (),' now the corresponding systcm behaves 
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Most real-wolld systems are too complex to allow rt~ali ,tic modds to be evaluated 
anaiytical!y. and these models are the ones that must he studied ut ilizing the advantages of 
simulation In a simulation, a computer is used to evaluate a model numerically and 
produce data (output) in order to estimale the desired true characteristics of the model 
Janus is a dynamic wargaming simulation uscd to imitate battlefield operations [Ref 9J 
2. Combat Simulation with Janus 
a. Characteristics of Janus 
Janus is an interactive wargaming simulation ini tially developed by the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory The Army has updated and revi~ed the 
program over the years to meet hoth combat development and training needs. The model 
is wntten in fORTRAN and has been adapted for usc with the UNIX operating system in 
a desktop computer network Janus(A), version 3 15 , was u~ed for this tbesis 
Janus is a high resolution, interactive, two-sided, closed, stochastic, ground 
combat simulation. This high resolution modelllilows the user to create units as small as 
individual infantry and vehicular weapons systems and place these systems in ground 
combat scenarios where the focus of the simulation is on the maneuver of the systems 
either individualiy or as elements of larger units The scenarios developed are two-sided 
placing two forces, Blue and Red, in opposition to each other. The simulation is dosed so 
that the dlsposit ion of one opposing force is unknown to l.he other until force locations are 
disc ~osed through direct observation and contact or through intelligence reports generated 
by :~riend l y forces It is interactive because it allows the user to make changes ill the 
scer.ario as events unfold without stopping the simulation, Finally, stochastic refers to the 
-'>iay the system determines the resu lts of actions like direct fire engagements or minefield 
crossing events according to the laws of probability and chance. [Ref JO 1 
h. llJajor Features and Capahilities 
The user nms simulations on digitized terrain maps developed for Janus 
from Defense Mapping Agency data. Each terrain map is a computer reproduction of 
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actual terrain and i" displayed i~ milital)' format usi~g thc Universal Transverse Mercator 
grid system These terrain mars realist ically model terrain contour, road,'>, vegetat ion, 
water and otiter obstac!P.s JanllS abo simulates the effects of light and weather, These 
factors a ~l affect system movement, visibility, and target acquisition and must be 
considered when planning a scenario, [Ref 10J 
rhe user plans t:le scenario and controL, the battle with a mouse. The user 
may task oIganize units and place them in defensive positions or put them in an offensive 
posture Units may he in full defilade, partial defilade, or put in prepared fighting 
posit ions, The user may designate movement routes from one positioll to another and 
plan movement starts and stops at specific times in the scenario These routes and times 
may be altered at any time in the scenario before execution, Urjts on the move are in an 
fxposed statlls but automatically go Into partial defilade after stopping Any weapons 
systems, whether on the rr.ove or stationary, may be placed in holdfire status This 
capability allows the use! to plan and direct fire on command, [Ref. 10] 
The user may designate some vehicles as troop car~'ie[s and mount or 
dismount them on command, The user may create minefields and simulate other man-
made ohstacles such as abatis, ditches and craters, Engineer vehicles may be equipped to 
breach and clear these minefields ant! obstacles, The user may abo create artillery and 
mortar systems and plan mdireCl fire missions. Other systems may be designated as smoke 
8e~erators that may be used to simulate the obscuration effects of smoke on the 
battlefield [Ref 10] 
The capabilities and features mentioned are just a few of those available to 
the use! Janus has an extensive and detai led database which the user can use to model 
systems and scenarios The Janus developmental database has three major sections: 
combat systems, terrai~ maps and symbols, and testing and analysis . The combat systems 
database is the portion in which the user creates new systems and alters existing ones, In 
the tenam and symbob database, lhe user can edit terrain maps, create and alter system 
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graphic symbols, and create map overlays for use in wargaming For testing and analysis 
the user puts systems and terrain into a scenario in which the systems and associated 
tactics can be tested The user can then collect and analyze data through the poSt-
processor to measure the effects of changes in systems and tactics 
3.l!sing Janus to Meet Research Objectives 
This thesis utili::o:es Janus in evaluating the tactical effectiveness of the Lemming 
swarming approach 10 "in stride" MeM in the VSW/SZlBZ. The tactical effectiveness of 
the Lemmings swarming concept was evaluated through a (;Qmparative analysis with 
traditional MCM (today's capabilities) and a bull breaching (no mine clearing) approach to 
MCM The bull breaching method served as a base line data generator with which to 
compare the other methods 
a. Advantage.~ of Using Janus 
I n order to meet the research objective, three scenarios were developed in 
Janus, each identically modeled except for differences in MCM method employed Janus 
offers an advantage of being able to create (simulate) identical environments in mUltiple 
scenarios through which comparative analysis can be performed The environments 
created can be all<~red between scenarios as mllCh or as little as desi red in order to 
measure the effects of such changes on the model. The real utility of simulation lies in the 
ability to analyze and make pn:dictions about new systems and tactics through the 
comparison of such alternative scenarios prior to actually developing or testing real-world 
systems and tactics. Tndications about a system's potential can be realized through 
simulation modeling, and as such, help shape the path that R&D ofthat system takes 
(I) Functional vs. Operational Aspects. Janus offers the advantage 
of being able to both evaluate a system's operational aspects (characteristics and 
performance capabilities) and a system's functional aspects (specifications) The 
operational aspects of Janus arc realized during scenario execution and post-processing 
data analysis, while functional aspects are realized through data base user inputs A 
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system's functional aspccb dirc(.:tly affe(.:t that ;;ystcn~ ' s operationc.l aspect;;. For instance, 
the modeling ofa system, such as a Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC), takes place in 
the data base (functional), whi le its performance anci effect On various aspects of a 
scenario (operational) are cvaluated during scenario execution and p05t-processing 
h. Scenarios of Interest 
The scenarios developed to meet the research ohjective are 
In developing these scenarios, cmcial assumptions were made concerning several aspects 
ofthe assault. These assumptions will be discusscd in Chapter II 
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n. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. JANUS COI\IBAT SYSTE MS DATA BASI{ 
It is within the Combat Systems Data fiase (C S) that each individual system (e.g .. 
LCAC. AAV, 11H-S3E, etc ) is c~eated, edited, and maintained Data baoe inputs include 
such' system charaocristics as dimensions, weight, carrying capacity, and spccd 
Additionally, weapon and sensor types and capabilities could have been incorporated into 
the data base 
.~dine typcs and minefield classifications are also defined by the user within the CS 
Data Base. as arc cach system's vulncl abi liLies to each mine Lype The assignment ofa 
breaching capability to an indiv ~dual system is made within the Force Dclinition file of 
Janus Hov,'evel . the effectiveness of each breaching method (e.g., plow, 101Ier, linc 
charge) is assigned within the CS Data Base In addition to lneaching method 
effectiveness, each method is also assigned a survival probability specifying the likeli hood 
that an )'yjCM system will survive given that it has encounteled a mine For example, a 
mine breaching plow attached to a tank may be assigned an 80 percent chance of 
successfu lly neullalizing a certain mine type (method effectiveness), but only a 75 percent 
chance of surviving given that it encountered lhat same mine (method survivability) 
Each system which is created within the CS Data Base is al so assigncd certain 
probabil ities relating to mine encounters For instance, an LCAC might be a5signed an 8S 
percent chance of activating a magnetic mine and, if mine activation occurs, only a 40 
percent chance of actually being killed by that mine. Each system is as~jgned different 
mine actIvation and mine kill probabilities for each type of mine being modded within a 
given scenario (e g , magnetic, anti-tank , bottom (;Ontact, etc.). System vulnelabilitv 
probabilities to mines and breaching method effectiveness plobabil ities specific to this 
thesis arc outJined in Appendix H 
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6. ASSUMPTlONS AND SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
I. Amrhibiuus Landing 
This thesis makes the assumption that the LF will be launched from the ATF over-
the-horizon (OTH) at approximately 20 run offshore from the amphibious objective area 
(AOA) The objective of this lanning is assumed to be the establislunent ofa beachhead 
2. Landing Art"~ 
The landing area (LA) is that pan of the objective area within which landing 
operations are conducted . It includes the beach, the approaches to the beach, the 
transport areas, the fire support areas, the air occupied by close supponing aircraft. and 
the land included in the advance inland to the initial objective. This thesis will refer to the 
LA as the landing zone (LZ) and limit this zone to include the VSW/SZJBZ, the landing 
lanes, craft landing site, and the bottom contact point (RCP). The ncr refers to that 
point at which an amphibious landing vehicle first touches the bottom (about 5-7 foot 
depth fo r a 
Figure 2. Schematic of Amphibious Landing Zone 
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L"ndir!g lanes refer to both the boat lane and the actual landing lane The boat 
lane has been modeled to be a 1 SO :neter wide lane that extends through the VSW, up to 
but not into, the SZ . The landing lane extends from the end of the boat lane, through the 
SZiBl , and terminates at the landing site, and has been modeled to be ::'0 meters wide 
The LZ has been modeled to be contained within a 1 squale kilometel legion [Ref 13] 
It must be understood that the attacking force selects the l:lnding site, not the 
defending fOlce However, since only cerrain coastal areas ale conducive to an 
amphibious land lllg, the defending force can make educated guesses about the !oeation of 
a possib le amphibIOus assault Several factors contribute 10 the decision as to where to 
land the force Thcse factors include such considetations as access inland once ashore, 
landing site vulnerability to enemy fire , tidal conditions, weathel patterns, coastal 
topography, and heach gradient. It is beach gradient which directly affects the work load 
on the l'vfCM effort and the danger to the 1,F Knowledge of the beach gradient is vitally 
lmpOrrant. because beach gradient is what determines Ihe likelihood of enemy mines being 
present and provides the basis for estimates of mine densities inlhe VSW/SZ!BZ regions 
For instance, a short, steep beach will not offer the defending force much loom to lay 
mlnes, Whlle a flat beach will aliow for extensive mining. This thesis will assume a flat 
oeach gradient, thereby affording the defending force the opportunity to lay a worst case 
density minefield The tide is assumed to be low during the assault, thus further increasing 
Ll' exposure to :nines on the beach. [Ref 11 J 
3 . . \line Warfare Group 
This section looks at the "decisions" made by the fictitious Commander, MW 
Group (CM\\'G), for each scenario_ These "deci.'ions" ale the author's assumptions 
concerning the MCM assets for each scenario Each CMWG has heen tasked with 
accomp:ishing "in stride" breaching for their respective scenario 
a. Bull Breaching 
For the Bull Breaching Scenario, the CMWG has decided to accomplish his 
2! 
' in stride" MCM objective by bull breaching the LF through the Mf The landing 
forma,ion of the Lf will be described in a later section 
b. Traditional 
For the Traditional Scenario, the CrvIWG has decided to utilize the 
followmg MCM assets described in Chapter L section C 
t M:H-53E Sea Dragon helicopters towing the Mk lOS magnetic sweep 
hydrofoils 
Amphibious Assault Vehicles equippedl-'-ith a line charge system (AAVLC) 
~ Amphibious Assault Vehide~ equipped with mine clearing plows (AA VP) 
The assumption is made that a reliable MCM plow is in service, which one 
wrrently is not, although the Caterpillar Corporation has developed and is testing what 
might be an effective plowing system. Addi tional ly, usc ofthe MOP has been omitted 
based on the fact tha t its reliability is significantly lower than that of the rvlk lOS that its 
use would only risk more helicopter assets than necessary to meet the ·'in stride" breaclling 
objective The AAV MCM assets are employed just prior to the BCP The decis ion has 
been made that should breaching assets be destroyed, the 1.1' win continue the assault 
The author realizes that in a real-world situation, more assets would likely 
be used to futther breach and proof lane~ FUIthermore. this thesis does not take into 
a(;count tbe usc of special forces conducting coven mine clearing/marking prior to an 
assau lt. However, the comparative and relative nature of this thesis, comparing one MCM 
asset against another, all ehe being equal, permits such asset omissions tn a real-world 
situation, Lemmings would likely be supplemented with other assets as well 
c. Lemmings 
The Lemmings Scenario CMWG has decided to utilize Lemmings 
swarming vehicles as the only ··in stride" breaching asset. Lemmings are assumed to be 
capable of command detonation or timed detonate in order 10 preserve their covert 
operation. although R&D of such a (;apability is still in its preliminary stages 
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4. Landing Force 
To land a tYPIcal Assault E~helon (AE), the Amphibious Task Force CATF) has]O 
Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and 36 Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) It IS 
assumed that a force such as this will require 90 LCAC loads in order to deliver the 
r~quired combat assdS ashore. ThIs assumption is based on the lift capacity of the LCAC 
and the force requirements needed ashore for a typical offensive amphibious operation, 
such as the one which was planned but never canied out during Desert Storm . This thesis 
... ",ill further break dO\."n the AE and will focus on a single Battalion Landing Team (BLT), 
using 10 LCACs and 13 At\ Vs to move the BLT ashore. The number of LCAC loads for 
one BLT is assumed to be 30 (one-third of the 90 needed by the entire AE). However, 
this thesis further refines the i\E by analyzing the landin.'-\ of the BL 1's 13 AA.Ys and only 
one ro:md-trip of the 10 LCACs attached to the BL T, instead of the three round-trips that 
would actually be required . By focusing on this abridged BLT for modeling purposes, 
total force effe~ts are not fost . Simple extrapolation can be used to see the effects on an 
entire AE. [Ref II ] 
It is assumed that the AAV is capable of an OTH assault . The AAV7Al moves 
only at 8 knots at sea, and the combat effectiveness ofthe troops within begins to decline 
after only 30 minutes due to noise, fumes , heat, and motion These deficiencies allow for 
a line of departure of only 2 nm from the beach, which is clearly nOt OTH This thesis 
assumes that the AA V can conduct effective OTH assaults This assumption is based on 
the capabilities of future assault craft, ~uch as the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
r he LF will make its approa(;h in echelon and wedge formations, moving into 
columns just prior to entering the landing l~nes The AAVs will cros~ through the l ~nes 
ahead of the LCACs, moving through the litLoral zones uti lizing both lanes, and once 
ashore advance inland to clear the landin.O\ site for the LCACs The LCACs v.'iJ I make 
their beach approach through lane A, offioad their equipment at the landing site, and then 
depart for their return to the ATF through lane H 
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5. Minefields, M.ines, and Minefield Densities 
a. ]l.Jinefields and Employment ,Het/lOds 
Janus models five kinds of minefields hand emplaced, ground vehicle 
emplaced, artillery emplaced, helicopter emplaced, and a manually operated ponable 
minefield Obviously, with Janus being designed to model ground comhat, these "canned" 
minefields are specifically designed to simulate land minefields As will become clear, it is 
possible to manipulate the databases of these five types of mine fields so that one can 
transform one of these land minefields into an ocean/liuoral minefield The author utilizes 
the hand emplaced (HAATI EtvfP), ground vehicle emplaced (II.{ECH- I), and the 
~clicopter emplaced (lvlECH-2) mineficlds Due to the stochastic nature ofJanus, each 
time a scenario is run, the placements of mines within the designated mincfields are 
(!lffercnt from previous executions orlhe same scenario (i,e., mine location within 
minefields IS random) 
A single HAND EMP minefield consists of99 mines placed regularly in a 
50 by 100 meter rectangle. The mines within this mindield are located in three stri.ps of 
33 mines each The three strips are 15 metl;':rs apart and within a single strip, the mines are 
placed every::; meters, alternately 3 meters to one side or the other of the strip . Lt should 
be noted that each time a scenario containing HAND EMP mineficlds is run, the 
placement of the mint!s along each of the three strips is random, only the spacing between 
the mines is a constant 3 meters. HAi\'D EMP mineficlds are located and oriented by the 
user dur ing initial planning (prior to execution of the scenario) The nurnbl;':r of desired 
I·IAND EMP minefields is generated by entering the desired number of HAND EMP into 
the Mine Type I field on Janus screen III 
1\,1ECH·I emplaced mineficlds consist of mines that have a unifonnly 
random distributio:l within each minefield The length and width of!v1ECH-1 minefields 
can be altered and set by the user The user chooses either low (40 mines), medium (80 
mine,), or high (160 mines) density, positions, and then orients the mineficlds during 
24 
init ial pLwning. This type of mnefield may be deployed 6ther during initial planning or 
during the ~cenar io execution phase The numher of desired :MECH-l minetields is 
gemnled by entering the desired number oftvfECH-J into the Mine Type 2 field on Janus 
screen III 
Janus only allow.'; for HAND EM? and IvIECH-1 minefieldsto be 
positioned dur ing the initial planning phase of a given scenario The remaining three types 
of minefield, must he interactively laid by the user during the scenario execution phase 
As a result, the MECH-2 minefldds being utilized in this thesis must be interactively laid 
once scenario execution has occurred 
The 11ECH-2 minefield is emplaced by giving a helicopter a movement 
route over the minefield site and dropping the MECI-J-2 minefields at the desired location 
rhe orientation of the minefleid is that ohhe helicopter 's flight path. The user decides 
through mouse commands when to drop the minefields from the helicopter The 
dimensions of the minetield can be altered by the user. The mines within .MECI-l-2 
rr.inetleids arc randomly but uniformly distributed within the minefield dimensions The 
densities are selected in an identical manner as that of the MECH- l 
b. Mine l:Vpe~' 
This thesis assumes the following mine types have been laid in the 
specified ;1.OlIes 
1-1agnetic influence mines in the VSW 
• Bottom contact milles in the 5Z (5 to iO feet depth) 
~ Anti-tank mines in the SZ (5 feet depth to HWM) and 131: 
Of the five types ofmineficlds, each can contain only one type of mine 
There are iO types of mines available in Janus, each type being defined by designated 
probabilities It should be pointed out that one Janus minetield is not equivalent to the 
author's one square kllorncler enemy mindield, through which the AE will cross. Thc 
enemy mineI1eld is composed ofa number of Janus mineficlds selected so that the encmy 
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minefield densities and mine types are appropriate for each littoral zone 
This thesis utilizes three of tile ten mine types avai lable. As discussed 
earlier, one central aspect of the VS\V!SZIBZ mine threat is that adversaries intent upon 
denying U. S and allied access to the beach will employ as many different types of mines 
as possible in the amphibious objective area (AOA), ranging from influence nlines in the 
VSW/SZ, to anti- invasion and anti- tank mines in the sz/nz region. [Ref 11 1 As 
previously mentioned, this thesis will assume magnetic influencl: minl:s in the VS\V, 
botwm contact in the SZ, and anti-tank mines in the SZIBZ region 
Jan ll~ mine type 1 will be designated as anti-tank mines and wi ll be 
dispensed by the HAND E\1P method in the SzrBZ region. Janus mine type 2 will he 
designated as bottom contact mines and will be dispensed by the :MECH-J method in the 
SZ region . Fi nally, 1anus mine type 3 will be designated as magnetic influence mines and 
will be dispensed by the !v1ECJ-l-2 method in the VSW region Again, the mine types are 
defined by various probabilities which are appropriate for the mine type being modeled 
c. Densities 
rhe minefield densities are assumed to be worst case 
* SOO mines per square kilometer in the VSW 
~ 1000 mines per square kilometer in the SZ 
~ 2000 mines per square ki lometer in the BZ 
The density assumption is di rectly linked to the flat beach gradient 
assu!:':,ption and densities can be considered inversely proponional to depth. [Ref II J 
Expected mine densit ies in the landing lanes were calculated using the worst case densities 
above and landing lane area per littoral zone. The results ofthe calculat ions indicate that 
80 mines per lane can be expected, on average, for each scenario nm, or 160 mines 
bttween the two landing lanes. figu re 3 is a schematic of the minefi eld densities 
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Figure 3. Beach Profile Showing \Vors:' Case Mine Den~itie, 
6. Enemy Forces and Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) 
It is assumed that the amphibious landing wi ll take place unopposed by enemy 
forces . This assumption was made in order to establish a clear base case comparison 
between MCM assets_ Additionally, the amphibious landing has not been modeled to be 
covered by NCiFS or air suppon However, Janus allows for such modeling and any 
future studies ofMCM assets and amphibious operations could incorporate such 
additio~ ls 
C SCE!liARIO DEVELOPMENT 
1. Bull Breaching Scenario 
The Bdl Breaching Sccnario simulates an amphibious landing through mined 
littoral zones without breaching operations being conducted prior to the assault. The 
intent of this scenario is to gauge the effect that heavily mined littoral zones would have 
on an amphibious assault being conducted with no breaching operations. The data 
generated from this scenario serves as a baseline for comparative analysis with the other 
,cenarios of interest The expectation is that the LF will experience significant losses on 
avcrage during scenario cxccution Rut, regardless of the results, the data generated will 
be used to gauge the relative effectiveness of both traditional and Lemming MCM 
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methods employed in the other scenarios. Despite not utillzing any sound breaching 
method, the LF will nevertheless transit the littoral zones in the column formations 
previously discussed 
2. Traditional Scenario 
The Traditional Scenario is an exact copy bfthe llullllreaching scenario, except 
that prior to the assault, \1F breaching is conducted in the VSW/SZfBZ regions, 
attempting to clear the two landing lanes. As previously mentioned, traditional MCM 
assets being utilized for "in suide" brcaching include the following 
* Two AAVLCs 
Four AA VPs, intended to proof the lanes cleared by the line charges 
The sequence of this traditional "in stride" breaching operation is as follows first, 
two Sea Dragons per lane sweep the VSW up to about the 8 to 10 foot depth, clearing the 
two 150 meter ,-vide lanes in the VSW region; second, one AA VLC per lane fires its line 
charge at about the BCP (5 foot depth line), ideally breaching a 15 meter wide landing 
lane from the BCP to the landing site, and finally, two AA VPs per lane follow the 
AA VLC, commencing plowing operations at the Bep, and ideally prooflllg and widening 
to ahout 30 meters the landing iane up [0 the landing site Once the lanes have heen 
breached, or MCM assets killed, the remainder of the LF will proceed with the assault 
3. Lemming Scenario 
As with the Traditional Scenario, the Lemmings Scenario is a copy ofthe Bull 
Breachm8 Scenario, except, of course, for the MCM method employed This scenario 
utilizes one Lemmings swarm per lane, each swarm consisting of 130 Lenunings, to breach 
the two landi;lg lanes. The size of each swarm was calculated using the estimated mine 
densities per lane and the 1.62 Lenuning-to-minc ratio suggestcd by Foster-Miller 
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The Lemming swarms are d~ployed by SEAL teams trom 6 ZODIACs at the 
IT.ollth of the landing lanes, at about the 40 foot depth curve The deployment occurs just 
before dawn and about 90 minutes from H-hour, the time that the first vehicle reaches the 
landing site This time frame enables the last of the TIZ mines to be neutralized by 
Lemmings Just as the first wave of the iF rcaches the VSW 
4. l\'leasures of EITecti\'elless (MOE) 
{LA/OEI 
MOE I, combat power ashore, is a critical indicator of the relative S\lCC~SS 
of the "in snide" MCM operations conducted prior to the assault, MOE I is relevant to 
smgle scenario analysis and comparative analysis of all three scenarios 
b. MOE 2 
MOE 2, landing force kills experienced during the assault, is also a critical 
indicator of the relative succ~ss of the "in stride" MC!\·l operations conducted in each 
scenario , The analysis of MOE 2 is also relevant 10 each scenario and to a comparison 
between scenarios 
Co J"IO£ J 
MOE 3, IOtal MCM assets killed, applies specifically 10 the Traditional 
Scenario, and as such, is of little value for comparative analysis between scenarios 
However, MOE 3 offers signifrcant insight into the analysis of110£ I and IvfO£ 2 with 
respect 10 the Traditional Scenario 
dMOE4 
MO£ 4, number of mines neutralized versus expected number of mines per 
landing lane, is relevant only to the Lemmings Scenario The analysis ofMO£ 4 
contributes to the analysis of MOE 1 and MOE 2 with respect to the Lemmings Sccnario 
It should be noted that tbe number of mines neutralized (killed) in the Lemmings Sc~nario 
is equal to thc number of Lemmings killed 
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5, Scenario Execution 
!\ collection of color slides taken during the running of each scenario are contained 
in Appendix C A bnef description of each image is presented and they are li sted in 
ehlOno!ogical order 
6. Data Collection and Analysis Concept 
As a stochastic simulat ion, Janus produces output that is itself random, and must 
therefore be treated as only an estimate of the true characteristics of the model. The 
stochastic nature of Janus output makes comparing the three scenarios on the hasis of only 
a single mn of each a very unreliable approach to analysis Consequently, 10 nlOS of each 
scenario were conducted in order to increase the accuracy and significance of the 
comparative analysis conducted on the difTerent MCM methods 
Data collection is accomplished using the Janus Post Processing (PP) program 
rhe pp lets the user retrieve repons compiled from recording files made during a 
simulatiOll run. There are len PP reports available, ranging from an Artillery [mpacts 
Report to Temperature and Workload Profil es Report The analysis for this th esis utilizes 
the Coroner's Report (CR) and the Mineflelds Repon (1I.1R). for each run of each 
scenario, these two reports were generated using the Janus PP 
The CR provides a detailed account of each kilL Each row gives information 
about a single kill, and the rows arc in chronological order. Information provided includes 
lime of kill, ki ll type, name of unit killed, location of kill , and information on the killer 
The MR furnishes information about minefields and minefield encounters The 
tvfR is divided into tWO sections, the first is the ivlinelicld Summary Report (MSR) and the 
second lS the Minefield Crossing Events Report (MCR). The MSR displays one row for 
e,x:h MF, providing information on the type of mine within the MF, the method for laying 
that "'if, location and dimension of the l'vlF, orientat ion angle, and density of the 11F. The 
MCR displays the followi ng informati on about units that encountered a given J\.1F t ime of 
encoumer, name ofuni! crossing a MF, whether that unit is conducting breachillg 
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operations or Ilot, entrance and exit points, and the r..1J' number 
Graphicaj a:ld statistical methods of data analysis are used in this thesis Graphical 
analysis includes multiple and single box plots of different kill categories, graphs of 
combat forces ashore versus time, a bar graph comparing percentage of breaching 
completed to percentage oflanding forces killed, and finally data tables summarizing 
different ~10E categories Although histograms are often very useful tools for analyzing 
and summarizing data distr ibutions, they offered no insight because of the relatively low 
number of scenario runs performed 
Box plots are summary displays of the distribution of data and provide an 
unmediate look at the prominent features of distr ibutions_ They give indications of the 
spread, density, and skewness of data, and are especially useful in identifying the means 
and medians of distributions A sample box plot is shown in Figure tj 
Figure 4. 
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MultJple box piots are good tools for comparing distributions of different samples 
The multiple box plots used in this thesis compare differenllanding force kill category 
totals between the three scenarios They will indicate whether these distributions are 
similar and highlight the differences (or similarities) in distribution locations among the 
different MCM methods tested 
rhe Mann-Whitney U test , a nonpararnetric statistical procedure, was used to 
analyze the kill data, since the outcomes from this simulation have an unknown 
distribution. The Mann-Whitney U test requires the samples to be randomly and 
independently selected from their respective populations and the U statistic is obtained by 
ordering all (nl nJ) observations according to their magnitude and counting the number of 
observations in sample 1\ that precede each observation in sample B. The U statistic is the 
sum of these counts_ This test is used to decide whether differences among samples 
indicate that these samples are ta:'-::en from different populations or whether they represent 
variations expected among random samples from the same population. It tests the null 
hypothesis, 
H o. The population relative frequency distributions for A and B are identical, 
against the alternative hypothesis, 
Fo~ a more detailed description of the Mann-Whitney U test, refer to Reference 14 
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Ill. ANALYSIS 
A. SCENARlO ANALYSIS 
Analysis of the post-processing data generated from runs of each scenario is 
conducted in this section Co:nparative ana!y~is between scenarios is conducted in the 
next section General descriptive statistics (e.g , mean, median, variance) for each 
scenario al-e contained in Appendix E Recall that data was generated from 10 runs of 
each scer,ario The expccted results of the analysis foll ow from experience and knowledge 
of MC\1 method capahilities Bull Breaching is expected to be the least successtil l of the 
breaching methods; Traditional Breaching is expected to be significantly hetter than Bull 
Breachmg; and Lemming swarms, according to system characteristics, operating 
pillameters, and expectations, arc expected to outperform traditional breaching The 
fo llowing analysis will support or weaken such expectations 
I. Bull Breaching Scenario 
II. MOE} 
Table I contains data on comhat power ashore (CPA) extracted from the 
Coroner's Report Combat power ashore figures were arrived at by using the number of 
kil ls per run obtained from the CR and extrapolating information from the known time of 
ind ividual kills. for instance, an LCAC has two opportunities to be killed, inbound or 
outbound. If an LCAC was killed inbound, then that LCAC is excluded from CPA 
calculations Rut, if an LCAC survives its inbound assault, only to be killed outbound, 
that L.CAC was able Lo off load its contents at the landing site and thus is included in CPA 
caicuiatlons In the case oflhe AA Vs, AAVs do Ilot return through the !l.1F, so either they 
project CPA or they are killed 
Table 1 breaks down CPA hy individual run as a function offive minute 
time intervals The aggregate total CPA (average total over the 10 runs) for the Bull 
Breaching Scenario was 2_5 landing vehicles a~hore 
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COMBAT POWER ASHORE; BULL BREACHIKG SCENARIO 
Tllblr 1. Combat Power Ashore as a Function of Tir:le; Bull Breaching Scenario. 
14 
b. !}fOE 2 
fable 2 contair,s information extracted from the CR and includes such 
landing fo rce kill categorics as lolal Lf kills. total AAV kills, total LCAC kills, and 
inbound/outbound LeAr: ki lls Each kill category is funhcr broken down by littoral zone 
kills Data on each Bull Breaching Scenario run is included, as well as aggregate ki ll 
figures Areas to focu~ on include the "gap" kills (i.e., 5Z kills) and total kill~ per 
category Obviously, agwcgatc total LCAr: kills plus aggregate total AA V kills equals 
the aggregate total LF kills 0:222 vehicles. Recall that the LF is composed o:'2} 
vehicles, iO LCAC s and \3 AAVs So, an aggregate tolal LF kill figure of222 indicates 
t. hat , on average, 97% oflhe LF was killed during each Bull Breaching assault . It is safe 
to say that such kills are devastating [0 any assault 
Also of interest is the high number of aggregate inbound LCAC kills This 
clearly indicates the presence of a vcl)' dense minefi eld It is expected that jf 11F 
breachmg is reasonably effective, which bull breaching is obviously not, that about the 
same pe~centage ofLCACs would survive inbound as outbound This expectation will be 
analyzed in the Traditional and Lemmings Scenarios sections 
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LANDING FORCE KJLLS; BULL BHEACBfNG SCENARIO 




rable 2. Lanning Force Kills; Bull Breaching Scenario 
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Figure 5 is a box pial of total LF kills for Bull Breaching. The position of 
'he median line is deceptivl;:, becausl;: the range ofblls represented on thl;: y-axis is small 
(ranging from 20 to 23 kills) The 10wI;:r adjacent value represents a very I<!rge number of 
kills. Ot.her than adding another visual aid in evaluating the kill distribution for Bull 
Breaching, this box plot does not offer any significant insight. In fact, the Bull Breaching 
analysis is quite straightfor"vard due to the excessive kills realized by the LF However, 
the analysis of tIns scenario is of great value when we begin to compare resul ts between 
the three tvfCM methods employed 
Figure 5. Box Plot of Total L<!ndi ng Force Kills; Bull Breaching 
Scenario 
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2. Traditional Scenario 
Q. MOEJ 
Table 3 is identical to the Bull Breaching CPA table, except that the data 
pe:tain~ to CPA for the Traditional Scenario On average, 10.2 landing force units per run 
ma:.le It ashore following the traditional "in str ide" MCM breaching efforts 
COMBAT POWER ASHORE; TRADITIONAL SCENARIO 
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h. MOE2 
Table 4 summarizes LF kill categories for the Tradit ional Scenario Again, 
it is imponant to focus on 5Z kills. The expectation is that of the three littorallOnes being 
evaluated, the SZ would account for the majority oflotal LF ki ll s_ However, this was not 
the case with this scenario Notice that under IOtal ki lls, the average numbel of kills in the 
S2 was 6 I, while in the BZ it was 104. After funher study, it became appalent that what 
is occurring is that the tradit ional MCM 5ZJBZ assets (the AA Vs) were breaching or 
panially breaching lanes in the SZ, but were not surviving long enough to make it to the 
beach 
LANDING FORCE KILLS; TRAJ>ITlQNAL SCENARIO 
Table 4. Landing Force Kill s; Traditional Scenario 
Recall f~om the Bull Breaching analysis that ifJ\.1F breaching efforts were 
reasonably effective, one would expect about equal LCAC kills inbound as outbound, and 
III the Traditional Scenario this expectation is realized with 3.7 LCAC kills in both those 
calego~les 
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Figure 6 is a mult iple box plot of tot a! LF kills and total SZ kills. It is not 
intcnded that a comparison be made between these two kill categories_ Tllis plot is useful 
in that it SClves as a quick indicator of the prominent features of the data distributions 
rhe total Lf kills are obviously skewed toward lower values, with a median of III and a 
mean of 16. '5. Also, that both of these kill categories contain lower adjacent values at the 
extremes indicates that if more scenario runs were conducted, one might expect the mean 
to fall even further So, the possibility exists that the Traditional Scenario MCM assets 
arc actually more effective than the data suggests 
FIgure 6. Muinple Box Plot of Total Landmg Force Kills and Total 
SZ Kil ls: Tradit ional Scenario 
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c. /'IfO£1 
Table 5 summarizes MCM asset kills from the Traditional Scenario As 
was expected, no VSW MCM assets (Mk 105) were killed_ A telling result is the average 
number of AAVLC kills One AAVLC per lane was killed during almost every run of the 
scenario If the AAVLC was killed prior to the BCP, the point al which the line charge 
could be fired , then the line charge was not fired and no breaching was accomplished by 
that unit If, however, the AAVLC was killed after the BCP, then the line charge was 
successfully employed prior to that unit's death Given that the AA VPs were intended to 
proof the lanes breached by the AAVLCs, if the AAVLCs were killed prior to line charge 
employment, then the AA VPs would have lower probabilities of successfully breaching up 
to the landing site This is the case because high BZ mine densities would remain and the 
plow has a relatively low probability of surviving if a mine detonates during plowing 
operations It appears that the preceding assessment is exactly what is occurring, given an 
average of 4 8 SZlBZ MCM asset kills 
MCM KILL; TRADITIONAL SCENARIO 
vsw MCM KilLS SZIIIl MCM KILLS TOT .... L 
MKIO~ MKI OI MKI OI MKIOI Al\V A,AV MV A,AV MV MV SZIl.lZ 
AI A1 BI 131 AI(LC) A1. AJ BI(lC) 132 BJ KllLS 
Ta ble 5. MCM Kills; Traditional Scenario 
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Figure 7 offers an alternative ror viewing the information contained in 
Table S Notice that the data is ~lightly skewed toward higher values 
Figure 7. Box Plot of Total MCM Asset Kills 
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Table 6 contains estimated percentages of breaching completed by SZ!BZ 
MCM assets Breaching percentages were calculated using the known length of the lane 
section that each unit was assigned to breach and the known location of each unit's death 
The difference between the kill point and the intended breaching completion point 
represents the uncleared portion of lane Breaching completion percentages were 
estimated using that information. The aggregate average breaching completion was 53 
percent That means that on average, 47 percent of the intended breaching area in the 
S7JBZ portion of the two lanes was not cleared 
Table 6. Estimated Percentage of Breaching Completed by Traditional Scenario SZJBZ MCM 
Assets (AA Vs) Prior to Asset Being Killed 
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Finally, Figure 8 is a bar graph comparing the percentage ofLr kills per 
run to percentage of S2m2 breaching completed per run. The best way to analyze this 
graph is to compare any two runs. In general, as breaching percentages increase from one 
nm to another, the Lr kill percentages will fall between those two runs. For instance, run 
J achieved approximately 40 percent breaching and realized neady 100 percent LF kills, 
while run 2 achieved about 70 breaching and only 60 percent LF kills. Of the three runs 
which managed only 40 percent breaching or lower, all three experienced greater than 90 
pc~cent Lf kills. Weare led to the simple principle: Heavy losses of Mew assets imply 
heavy losses 11/ the LF 
Figure 8. Bal Graph Comparing Percentage of Landing Force Kills Per Run To Percentage ofSZ!BZ 
B~eaching Complete Per Run for Traditional Scenario 
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3. Lemmings Scenario 
a. MOE] 
fable 7 represents CPA for the Lemmings Scenario On average, 19.6 LF 
umts made it ashore ref IUn, or over 85 pel cent of the total fooce 
COMBAT J'OWER ASHORE; LEMMINGS SCE~ARIO 
" I 
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Table 7. Comhat Power Ashore as a Function of Time, Lemmings Scenario 
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h. AlOE 2 
Table 8 contains LF kill categories specific to the Lemmings Scenario For 
this scenario. the average IOtal LF kills is 4.3 per run. Notice that the average number of 
BZ kills in all kill categories is close to zero, and that total 5Z kills account for the 
majority of IOta I kills (though it is only 2.1 52 ki lls per run) , As was the case with the 
Traditional Scenario, inbound and outbound LeAC kills are nearly etjual 





Table 8. Lancing Force Kills; Lemmings Scenario 
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Figure 9 IS a multiple box plot providing another way to view IOtal LF kills 
and total S2 kills In both cases, the data is skewed toward higher values_ Notice that 
during one run, the upper adjacent value raJ' total LF kills climbed as rugh as 10 and the 
lower adjacent value rell to one in another run 
II I 
Figure 9. Multiple Box Plot of Total Landing Force Kills and 
Total S2 Kills, Lemmings Scenario 
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c. MOE4 
MOE 4 is specific to this scenario Table 9 summaril.es MOE 4 and 
measurcs the number of mines neutralized by LClnmings. Thc number ofLcnunings killed 
cquals the number of mines neutralized. Recall that 80 mines per lane werc expected 
based on worsl case minefield densities, for a total of 160 mines between the two lanes 
Utilizing 1.62 Lemmings pcr mine, the average number of mines neutralized was 1354, or 




"UMBER SW . -.RMA 
Table 9. LemmingIMine Kins; Lemming Scenario 
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Fieure]O is a box plot of IOta I mine kills data from Table 9. The box plot 
appears to represent a normal distribution. Note aere that Wil~ Lemmings we have a 
differenl principle. iJeavy losses of Lemmings .\fe\f assets implies increased survivability 
of the LF 
Figure 10. Box PIOl afTolal Lemming/1l.1ine Kills, Lemming 
Scenario 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
1. MO E 1 
The graph in Figure II compares average CPA versus time between the three 
scenarios The differences in CPA are obvious, with Bull Breaching realizing the least 
number of forces ashore and Lemmings realizing the greatest number The last of the 
AAVs reaches the landing site around the \40 minute mark and the first LCAC reaches 
the beach around the 144 minute mark Given this information, the Bull Breaching CPA 
curve IS honzontal from about the I 18 mark until the 132 mark, indicating that over a 14 
minute period no forces (AA Vs in this case) reached the beach Similar lulls in CPA occur 
10 [he other scenarios around this same time frame, though not for as long. As it turns 
out, thiS time interval coincides with the time that the first AAVs are crossing through the 
SZ The "gap" is the only zone which produces such distinct horizontal stretches in the 
CPA curves of all three scenarios 
~ 
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Figure 11 Comparmg Average Combat Power Ashore Between 
Scenarios 
so 
2. MOE 2 
Table 10 compares total LF kills between the scenarios It is obvious that total LF 
ki lls fall dramatically between scenarios, with Bull Breaching having the most and 
Lemmil1g~ the least number of average kills. Notice that in all littoral lOne categOIies, 
similar drop~ between scena]"io~ occur, except for 132 kills between Bull and Traditional 
As discus~ed in the Traditional Scenario analysis section. the rcason for no decline in BZ 
ki lls between these two scenarios is that the SZ!BZ MCtvl assets in the Traditional 
Scenarios arc heing killed before they can reach the 13Z The reason these MCM assets 
are dying prior 10 the BZ is the "gap" The SZ n~gion is the most difficult for traditional 
MCM assets to effectively hancile 
TOTAL LA;'IIDING FORCE KILL COMPARISO;'ll BETWEE;'II 
SCENARIOS 
Table to. Total Landing Force Kill Comparison Between Scenarios 
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Figures 12 and 13 are multiple hox plots comparing total LF kills and total SZ LF 
kills between scenarios, respectfully. They clearly show the drop in LF kills experienced 
as a result of different MCM methods employed. The difficulty in effectively countering 
the SZ mine thleat with traditional MCM methods is i llu~trated once again by the 
similarities between the box plots of total SZ LF kills (Figure II) for Bull Breaching and 
Traditiona!. Appendix F contains additional box plots of the different LF kill categories 
l~~~~~~~~~~ 
Figure 12. Total Landing FO'ce Kil ls 
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3. _''lann-Whitney U Test 
To determine whether the diffe rence, in IvrCM methods hetween scenarios are 
significant, the Mann-Whitney U test (one-tai led) is conducted on the following three pairs 
ofbreacblng methods: Bull Breaching/Traditlonal (AI), Bull Breaching/Lemmings (A2), 
and Traditio nal/Lemmings (AJ) The null hypothesis is identical :or the three tests 
{'he effectiveness ofthc different \~CM methods is measured as a function ofLF kills per 
sccnario, The null hypothesis is tested against the following alternative hypotheses lor 
each scenario pairing 
H" 
Lellllnings i.'; more effective than Bull Breaching 
HA./ Lemmings is more effective than Traditional Breaching 
Using a signifiGance level of 0,05 (alpha value), the following ?-values were 
calculated fro~n the Mann-Whitney U test (one-tailed) 
~ Bull/Traditional: p-value = 0,0005 
~ Bull/Lemmings: p-value = 0 0002 
* LemmingsiTraditional p-value = 0,0002 
The null hypothesis is rejected in all three cases Therefore, the Mann-Whitney U 
test suggests the fo llowing: that there is a high probability that the breaching method of 
the Traditional Scenario is mo re effective than that of the Bull Breaching Scenario; lIlat 
Lemmings is more etTectlve than Uull Breaching, and that Lemmings is more effective than 
r radit ional Breaching Based on the previous analysis, these results are not unexpected, 
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however, the Mann-Wllitney U test offers funher proof that the conclusions arrived at 
about the MCM simulation models are valid_ Refer to Ref 14 for details of how the p-




The obJectivc of this thesis was to evaluate the effe(..tiveness of the Lemmings 
swarming aoproach to "in stride" MCM in the VSW/SZrRZ, and compare this new 
technology with current naval "in stride" MCM capabilities for those littoral zones. The 
objective was met by utilizing Janus to create three simulation models (scenarios) with 
which to test and cvaluate the differem MCt..1 technologies and methods The scenarios 
developed were executed 10 times each, with data being generated on each run. An 
analysis of the data was then performed, resulting in numerous tables and graphs 
summarizing the data relevant to the thesis objective The analysis indicated clear and 
distinct differences among the various MeM methods modeled and tested 
Dunng scenario development, it became necessal)' to li mit the scope of the 
research, and as such, cer1ain assumptions were made pertaining to the different MCM 
methods and scenario formulation Recall that all three scenarios are identical except for 
the MCM methods employed The assumptions made are summarized below 
Thc basic scenario, of which all three test scenarios are based, includes the 
amphibious landing, landing zone, and minefields The assumptions made concerning this 
basic scenario are as follows 
~ The LF is a single BL T, one-third of a typical AE, and is composed of 11 
AA Vs and 10 LCACs 
The LCACs make only one round trip between the ATF and the landing site 
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• The minefield densities are considered worst case 
to include anti-tank mines in the ez, bottom contact 
S2, and magnetic influence mines in the VS\\! 
* The landing zone includes two landing lanes 
* Any oreaching employed will be conducted under the auspices of "in stride" 
breaching 
The only assumption made concerning the Bull Breaching Scenario was that the 
amphibious landing be wnducted without any breaching assets being employed The 
landing force will bull its way through the minefield 
The assumptions made concerning the Traditional Scenario are as follows 
Current Navy MCM assets were utilized to conduct "in stride" breaching 
The Mk lOS mine sweeping hydrofoil was used to counter the magnetic mine 
threat 
AAVs equipped with a line charge system were used to oreach the BZ 
The assumptions made concerning the: Ltmmings scenario 
¥ Utilize Lemming swanns as the sole MC~I asset for "in stride" breaching 
• Lemming swarms are deployed by SEAL teams 
Along wilh the assumptions necessary to effectively simulate a real-world 
situation, cenain expectations were formed prior to conducting any analysis of the 
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snllulatioll output data. T\ \\'a5 expected that Bull Breaching would result in the highest 
pelcentages ofLF kills during an assault Traditional Drcarhing assets WCfe expe~ted to 
outperform Oull Breaching Additionally, the SZ region was expected to account for the 
majo:-ity of LF kills when utilizing traditional MCM methods. Re~ause or the high dell';ity 
of the !v1F, kills in the Bull Breaching Scenario were expe;:ted to be proponionai to the 
mine densities in the variolls littoral zones The Lemming swarms were expected to 
eiTeclively neutralize mines in the SZ These pre-expectations served as a base with which 
to compare actual scenario data analysis 
The extensive data generated by Janus and packaged in the form of the Janus Post 
Processor provided the information with which aU data analysis was performed. Tn 
general, thc pre-expectations were realized. However, there were some exceptions, such 
as the high number of traditional MCM assets killed prior to reaching the BZ and the 
:remendous SUC(;CSS of traditional MCM assets in the VSW , The analysis did support the 
\,fine Warfare Plan's assessment of the dangers posed by the S2 to Oll r current forces 
B. RECOMMENDA TIOl\"S 
The evaluation ofLemming~ as an effec:ive "in stride" MCM for the VSW/SZlB2 
indicates that the system, as modeled, has Jeal potential to significantly contribute to our 
MCM forces and to strengthen our ability to conduct effective, rapid, amphibious assaults 
in the world's littoral regions 
The objective of this thesis was not to highlight v.'eaknesses in our current MCM 
forces, but rather was lntended to produce relative performance evaluations of the MCM 
forces modeled in a vel)' specific scenario with clear assumptions The analysis suggests 
that traditional breaching methods would be effective in a real-world situation, with all 
assumptions (restrictions) removed However, given the inherent danger and risk involved 
in an amphibious landing, high I1lllnbers of casualties could be expected when utilizing 
today's MC\,f assets Lemmi ngs analysis indicat~s that the Lemmings method could be 
substantially more effective than current MC\-1 ass<.-'1S when conducting an "in stride" 
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breaching ope~ation Recall the negative impact that the "gap" had on the Traditional 
1\1Gvl assets, and how that impact resulted in heavy HZ LF losses. Lemmings offers a 
possible solution to the "gap" killing lone 
This thesis suggests that the Lemmings MCM system deserves serious attention 
and shodd be studied much more thoroughly, conducting real-world testing and analysis 
on the system Simulation modeling does not completely represent the real-world, and 
that is not its intent What simulation modeling can do is point out potential strengths and 
weaknesses ofa given system. Then, based on an analysis of such models, decisions can 
be made abowt whether or not funher research is in order for such a system This thesis 
assl:r1s that further research should be conducted on Lemmings and that real-world 
testing and analysis is called for with the Lemmings MCM system 
loday's MCM forces would be much more effective if supplemented by 
Lemmings J n a real-world situation, the combination of current MCM assets and 
Lemmings assets could make effective, reliable "in stride " breaching a reality 
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APPENDIX A. LKMl\l1NGS 
The Lemmings swarmmg vehil:le, designed and dcvelop~d by foster-Miller, Inc , 
offer<; one solution to the MCM problems associated with the VSWfS7J BZ. Design 
speciflr.atiollS a:1d operating parameters and characteristics were provided by Foster-Miller 
and arc contained in this appendix 
Lemmir,gs are currently undergoing field testing and analysis and arc designed 
specifi(;ally to counter mines in the VSW/SliSZ uti lizing a swarming approach to mine 
CQUlllCrrneasurcs The init ial development concentrated on several operational 
requirements needed to create such a swarming MC~l system: the environment in which 
Lemmings would have to operate, the lyjICS of mines requiring neutral ization, the method 
o:- neutra!ization, the sensors necessary to find such mines, the system platform (vehicle 
spccifica:ions), the best search pattern, and finally cost. The environment, the 
VS\V ISZ/EZ, was generally considered to be uniform and benign, except for crashing 
waves. The uniform environment assumption was based on the probability that an enemy 
would only mine beaches and littoral regions susceptible to invasion, and hence would 
most likely he composed of sandy, muddy, and gravelly beaches, containing eel grasses 
and kel~ , but no insurmountable natural obstacles (an invasion would not take place along 
a jagged, rocky coast) 
The mines in slIch an envir onlllent were assullled to be counter-invaslOn mines 
(bottom contact, anti-tank, anti-personal, influence, etc. ). However, anything manmade 
which is discovered in the invasion environment must be considered a target, since it 
could be an ant;-invasion ohstacle. Of course, manmade includes heer cans, fisherma n's 
boots, and other trash, but sllch object." are dealt with either by !lumber ufMCM assets 
deployed or sensor capabilities of the Lemming 
The sensors chosen for Lemmings would need to detect bo:h buried and exposed 
targets with a high degree of accuracy The search pattcrn would need to offer the highest 
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probabili ty of detcction and the vehicle itselfwoli id nced to be as robust and versatile as 
possible. Cost was always wnsidercd during the design phase of Lemmings. The 
swarming concept req uires large numbcrs of vehicles to cffectively counter mines, so cost 
was a big consideration during design. The results of Lemming R&D are summarized 
belo,," by design and operational parameters 
Lemming are 
~ SmaJl, bottom crawling, expendable mine hunter-kiJlers; 
~ Designed for massively parallel operations in the VS\V/SZIBZ, 
~ Adaptable to various delivery means (air, surface, or subsurface); 
* Capable of flex ible payloads (ordnance, surveillance, sensors, etc. ) 
Lemmmg r:apablli/les are summarized 
¥ Each travels 1,8 miles, one acre swept path; 
* Highly redundant search pattern; 
~ Detects buried or exposed targets; 
~ Command detonates and neutralizes target; 
• Alternate missions include surveillance, reconnaissance, and marking 
Lemmmg features are summarized 
Inexpensive (approx. $300 per vehicle); 
~ Small (0 8 ciiunit); 
~ Highly redundant, 
Lethal payload (7 .5 Ill); 
" Coven; 
• Clears tactical lane in 2 hrs, 
" 98 percent mine clearance, 95 percent confidence; 
~ Simultaneous neutralization; 
~ Self sterilizes 
Lemmmgs hene/its are summarized: 
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~ M in:mal platform exposure/personnel independent; 
~ Aflordahle training, operation; 
,. Minimal ·",'el l deck volume, 
,. Operales in VSW/SZiBZ, 
" Platform independent, 
~ Frees lead landmg craft for waf fighting; 
,. Complements existing MCM 
Lemming swarms are capable of employing many different search patterns Three 
of the mO~1 utilized are referred to as "Gaussian", "Face Mecca", and "Squeegee" The 
sea:-ch patterns of individual Lemmings arc referred 10 as quasi-random and combine 10 
mak!: the swarm patterns. First, what is mcant by quasi-random? 
Quasi-random refers to each vehick' s ahihty to be plogrammed to move forward a 
randomized amount of Ii fie limited to within x to y sc<:oncis, and then turn it randomized 
numher of dl:grccs, limited within certain levels The values of the limits set the expansion 
rate of the swarm diffusion If the time limit is kept short (e.!L 0 to IS seconds), the 
straight travellcgs arc short and an intense search in a small area results, but the expansion 
i~ slow ConSlderation~ involved are vehicle speed and search requirements. Foster-MiliCI 
has experienced the best results using 0 to 15 second time limits and 0 to 36() degree turn 
angles 
To " Face Mecca" , each Lemmings is given a compass bearing (toward the beach), 
and every so lIlany steps (e,g., 75 steps) the Lemmings face the beach (Mecca). They do 
not necessalily go toward the beach, rather they simply face it. This indexing biases the 
search pattern and the group migrates toward the beach By altering the various 
parameters, the lateral dispersion can be influenced and the abi lity to "go back" and find 
missed mines can he achieved. "face Mecca- ' swarms have heen highly successfitl during 
simulation and flt~ld tests 
Squeegee" is a pattern which means that at some inten/aI , say 75 steps, the 
(,1 
vehicles move toward something, such as shallower water or the beach, rather than simply 
face It The result is that each vehicle reaches the beach faster and in a denser swann, 
however, ifin their advance they happen to miss a mine, the algorithm will not allow them 
to go hack The "Squeegee" pattern is ideal for moving a swarm into a general area, bu; 
inadequate for searching 
Filially, the "Gaussian" pattern is when a swarm is deployed in the middle of a NlF 
without any programmed headings, The pattern is simply Gaussian, and is ruled by the 
laws of statistics Ideally, the "Gaussian" swarm is an extremely powerful tool and testing 
and analysis continue to look for the best way to employ this ability 
The best swarm for a given !\1f is usually a combination of the search patterns 
For example, "Squeegee" might be utilized to get the swarm to move from shallower 
water to lhe VSW region (e.g., if Lemmings were deployed ITom a submarine which did 
not want to get to close), Once in the VSW, the swarm would employ "Face !vJecca" to 
search for mines For small ~1Fs, the vehicles get 5hort randomization\ and for large 
MFs, they get longer interval~, etc 
Foster-Miller has found that a 1, 62 Lemmings-to-mine ratio is required to achieve 
98 percent clearance of a given density MF , If that ratio is increased, the ability of 
Lemming swarm~ to cover ~uch things as sensor fail ures and quicker coverage rates 
in~rease~, a~ well 
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APPEND[X n. MODELING SYSTEM PRO BAHlLITTES 
This appendix contains information on the percentage of reliabili ty and 
survivabil ity of each breaching asset, on landing foret: mine activation and kill 
probabilities, and on the dud probabilities of each mine type 
Each breaching asset is assigned a probability (reliability) that it will successfuHy 
neutra lize each mine type il encounters, and a probability (survivability) that ifil 
encounters a given mine type that it will survive that encounter Reliability (R) and 
survivabi li ty (S) probabilities are contained in Table B 1 
Table 81. Reliability/Survivability Probabilities for Tradi tional Breaching Assets. The Star (") 
Represents the Fact That Once a Line Charge is Expended, It Cannot Be Reu sed Probabilities 
Expressed as Percentages 
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Each landing force system (e.g., AA V, LCAC) is assignerl a probability 
(activation) that it will activate a given mine type if such a mine is encountered, and a 
probability (kill) that ifactivati~n occurs will that unit be killed. Activation (A) and kill 
(K) probabili ties for landing force systems arc contained in Table B2 
lANDlKGFORCE 
SYSTEM 








Table 132 . Probabi lities of Mine Activation and Prob~bilities of Being Killed If Activated For 
Landing Forcc Systems The Star ( . ) Indicates Percentage Based On Track Hitting the Mine 
Probabilities Expressed as Percentages 
Finally, Table B3 contains the probability that each mine type will fail to activate if 







Table B3. Mine Dud ProbabJ!ltles Expressed 
as Percentages 
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APPENDIX C. SCE",' ARIO D1A GES 
Selected images cop~ed from actual runs ofthc Janus scenarios are contained in 
this appendix The figures aTC arranged in chronological order, with general setup images 
presented first, followed by Bu ll Breaching images, Traditional images, and finally 
l.emmings images. A orief cxplaniition of c(t(;h image is included oelow 
General sn:na,-io images 
Figure C t. Full View of the Landing Zone and Littoral Regions. The CoaSI Appears as a 
Brown Line 
figure C2. Red For~e Helicopter l.aying Magnet ic Mines in the VSW 
BII/! Breachmg ScenarIO 
Figure C3. The AA V Approach Formation At About 15 nm Off-Shore with .\l ovement 
Routes Shown 
Figure CS. LCACs Crossing r-.1F Following the Loss of 13 of 13 AAVs 
Figure C6. The '"Lone" LCAC" A..'ic r the Loss of9 of 10 LCACs 
Tradilional Scenario' 
Figure C8. LCACs Crossing MF Following the Loss of3 of 13 AAVs 
Figure C9. 2 ofl0 LeACs \Vere K illed Crossing the i\1F 
Lemmmgs Scenario . 
. Figure C IO. Movement Routes of ZOO lACs to the Lemmings Drop Point At the Mouth 
of E?ch l.anding Lane 
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Figure Cll. Lemmings JuSt After Deployment. Each Lemming Symbol Represents 43 
lr.dividual Lemmings, Thus 'Making Up Two Swarms of 129 Lemmings Each 
Figure C 12. 28 Lemmings Were Killed. \Vhich Indicates that 28 Mines Were 
Neutralized 
Figure C13. Zero AAVs Were Killed 
Figure C14. Zero LCACs Were Killed 
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Figure C 2. Red Force Hcllcoptcr Laying Magnetic Mines in the YSW 
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Figure C4. The AA Vs Moving into Column Formation to Cross Through the MF and the 
LeAC Wave Approaching AI About 15 nm 
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Figure CS. LCACs Crossing MF Following the Loss of J3 of 13 AAVs 
7J 

Figure C6. The "Lone" LCAC' After the Loss of9 of 10 LCACs 
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Figu."e C 7" AA V 5 Commencing Their Assault Through Breached Landing Lanes 
Breached Areas Are Ind icated By Yellow Lanes 

Figure es. LCACs Crossing MF Following the Loss of3 or J) AA.Vs 
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Figure C9. 2 of 10 LCACs Were Ki lled Crossing the MF 
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Figure C I O. Movement Routes of ZODIACs to the Lemmings Drop Point At the Mouth 
of Each Landing Lane 
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Figure ell. Lemmings lust After Deployment. Each Lemming Symbol Represents 43 
Individual Lemmings, Thus Making Up Two Swarms of 129 Lemmings Each 
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Figure CI3. Zero AAVs Were Killed 
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Figure C1 4. Zero LCACs Were Killed 
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APPENDL-X D. m:SCRlPT]VE STATISTICS 
General descriptive statistics on the various LF kill categories are included in thi, 
appendix and are sununarized in Table OJ 
Table DI. Descriptive Statistics on LFKili Categorics 
8) 
" 
APPEND[x E. LF KILL CATEGORY BOX PLOTS 








I' lgure E2. SZ AAV Kills 
83 
~ 1 
= j I , ~~~ 
~ I • . 1 ~ 
Figure E3. Total LCAC Kills 
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FIgure E4. MultIple Box Plot of SZ LCAC Kllis 
Figure E5. Multiple Box Plot of Inbound LCAC Kills 
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